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Abstract:
This chapter explores a mechanism that ties party choice at the individual level to election-level
turnout rates. It employs survey and election data from 14 countries over 20-50 years. It builds on
past findings that used error correction models to confirm the role of negative feedback in
maintaining equilibrium ratea of party support. On that foundation it proposes a parallel mechanism
that helps to maintain an equilibrium rate of turnout, through voter reactions to evolving rates of
electoral competition. It finds that party-level competitive processes are complemented by
individual-level evolutions of partisanship differences. The chapter treats voter turnout, policy
congruence, and party support as aspects of a single dynamic process at the party level of
aggregation and investigates the individual-level and election-level concomitants of this process,
also validating the dynamic account of turnout processes suggested in earlier work.

Keywords: Electoral participation; partisanship; equilibrium voter turnout; error correction
turnout models.

1) Introduction1
One reason people vote at an election is to support a preferred party in its quest to influence the
course of public affairs.2 As long ago pointed out by Downs (1957), eligible voters’ willingness to
vote (paying the “costs” of voting, in Downs’s terminology) depends on the extent to which they
prefer one candidate over another. If they have no strong preference between parties competing
for their votes, then they might as well save themselves the trouble (1957:39).
This insight seems to provide grounds for supposing that the voter turnout rate might be linked
to the extent of partisanship and, indeed, past research has found a strong connection between
declining partisanship and declining turnout, at least in Britain. Heath (2007) even suggested
(building on the work of Eric Plutzer, 2002) that previously high partisanship might have played
a role in maintaining the long-term stability of high voter turnout. The temptation is to go further
and think that the acquisition of partisanship might come hand-in-hand with the acquisition of a
“habit of voting” that apparently results from repeated acts of voting (for a survey of relevant
literature see Dinas 2018). But I also follow Plutzer (2002) in arguing that partisanship plays a
more fundamental role in maintaining long-term turnout stability, locking down behaviors at the
individual level of analysis that have other sources. In this chapter I suggest a causal path by which
this stabilization can occur, using survey and aggregate data from 14 countries over 50 years.
I base my approach on findings at the party level of aggregation that show how parties try (by
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Online appendices for this chapter can be found at https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/facpub/314
(permanent URL).
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André Blais would rate this reason as secondary, effective only when civic duty is lacking (Galais and Blais
2016). But it is noteworthy that non-voters do not explain their failures to vote as due to lack of civic duty.
Even when structural equation modeling shows apparently clear evidence of duty’s primacy (ibid.), the
implicit effect on non-voting is essentially an effect on missing data. Models using the duty variable are all
of them mis-specified on this account.
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modifying their policies) to re-attach voters disenchanted by previous policy failures (Franklin and
Lutz 2020). These policy-related developments give rise to an equilibrium rate of party support
that, over time, is repeatedly disturbed only to be re-instated (perhaps at new levels of party
support). I suggest that a second but closely connected dynamic process should have similar
consequences for turnout, as newly competitive elections restore voter support for parties whose
inattention to voter preferences had previously cost them votes. In other words, the cycle of loss
and restoration of party support should be mirrored by a cycle of loss and restoration of competitive
elections; with more competitive elections restoring turnout rates that fell at previous, less
competitive, elections (cf. Franklin 2004; Pacheco 2008; Evans Ensley and Carmines 2014). I then
explore the individual-level and election-level concomitants of this suggested party-level
mechanism. I show how findings at each level serve to explain otherwise anomalous observations
at other levels of analysis.
In brief, this chapter studies the interplay of these multi-level processes by combining survey
with aggregate data and investigating the extent to which proper model specification requires data
at all levels simultaneously.

2) Habitual voting and the dynamics of turnout variations
I start with the insight expressed in a foundational study of voting behavior (Campbell et a1. 1960)
that people are far more likely to vote who care about an election’s outcome. But those authors
point out (1960: 496) that most of the reasons that would make people care about the outcome are
not related to turnout. They found just one individual-level phenomenon reliably associated with
turnout: partisanship. Respondents who more closely identified with a political party were more
likely to vote. Campbell and his co-authors saw this identification with party as being closely
associated with age (1960: 497). Twelve years later Verba and Nie (1972, 1987) revisited the topic
2

and labeled the phenomenon of rising turnout with increasing age a “start-up” phenomenon. This
was mirrored by a ”slow-down” phenomenon (also noted by Campbell and his co-authors) among
older voters. Verba and Nie gave close attention these phenomena but did not manage to fully
explain the startup phenomenon. Another thirty years were to pass before, addressing this
theoretical gap, Plutzer (2002) demonstrated persuasively that young adults experience a
“transitional” period that leads them to either acquire a “habit of voting” or, alternatively, a “habit
of non-voting.” This finding was repeatedly confirmed over ensuing years in a series of
experimental and quasi-experimental studies, the first one published only a year after Plutzer’s
seminal article (Gerber, Green and Schachar 2003). For a survey see Dinas (2018).
It is tempting to suppose that this literature regarding habit-formation provides the link between
partisanship and turnout, both resulting from habitual behavior. The temptation is strengthened
when we notice that the correlation between turnout and partisanship is even stronger than the
correlation between turnout and age (r=0.83 for partisanship and turnout across the countries I
focus on in this chapter, as compared to r=0.68 for age and turnout).3
But fastening on evolving partisanship as a source of evolving turnout would ignore the careful
work of Eric Plutzer (referenced earlier) who saw differences between rates of partisanship for
different groups of people as consequences of the transition to habitual voting rather than its cause,
with the impact of partisanship more evidently flowing from the young adults’ parents than from
young adults themselves, the objects of his study (Plutzer 2002: 51). Plutzer’s insistence on
partisanship as a stable trait instead focuses us on that variable’s role in explaining the slowmoving evolution of election-level voter turnout, the topic to which we now turn.

These correlations are for voting and partisanship aggregated to the level of age in years, I truncate the
age scale at age 70 so as to focus on the age range characterized by rising turnout.

3
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Past research (Franklin 2004; Johnson et al. 2007; Vowles et al. 2017) has seen voter turnout
as an archetypical example of a quantity that is in dynamic equilibrium. For any given country at
any given time, turnout sits at a rate set by a balance of forces. Most of those forces are slow to
change and are largely captured by the rate of turnout at the previous election ("turnout

t-1"

in

statistical parlance). One can think of these forces as manifesting the power of inertia in human
affairs, serving to hold back turnout change.
Nevertheless, things do change. An influence on aggregate-level turnout, stable for decades,
can alter as a result of legislation or other factors. More importantly, some forces are by their
nature quite ephemeral. The marginality of the election (which can motivate people to vote in a
tight race who might not have voted had the outcome been a foregone conclusion) is a quintessential short-term force. Another is the electoral clarity bestowed by a party that receives close to
50% of the votes (such parties, if large enough, can govern alone and, if not quite large enough to
govern alone, will dominate any coalition of which they form part, simplifying the decisionprocess for voters – see Russo et al. 2020). Long-term forces, by contrast, are more closely
associated with the political system than with party politics. Often, such forces are institutional or
quasi-institutional in nature: rules such as the voting age or whether voting is compulsory.
A short-term force that has received little attention in turnout studies plays a central role in this
chapter: voter-party policy congruence (the proximity of voters to parties, here operationalized in
left-right terms).

3) A unified view of party choice, partisanship and turnout
In the chapter I co-authored with Georg Lutz on partisanship in the process of party choice (Franklin
and Lutz 2020) we used error correction models to investigate the way in which variations in policy
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congruence between voters and parties govern fluctuations in party support around a central
tendency established by partisanship, consistent with classic theorizing (Campbell et al. 1960). In
this section, I revisit and build on those findings to theorize a connection between party choice and
turnout such that voter-party policy congruence contributes to the maintenance of an equilibrium
rate not just for party support but for turnout as well.
The balance of forces that maintains an equilibrium rate of party support involves a feedback
loop that “corrects” the policy positions taken by political parties when those positions drift away
from supporter preferences. These forces are illustrated in the flowchart shown in Figure 1.

(1)
(lower)
Voter-party congruence t1
(2)
(lower)
Party support t1

(3)

(adjusted)
Party policy t3
(4)

(party policy drifts away
from voter preferences)
(6)

(restored)
(restored)
(5)
Voter-party congruence t3
Party support t3+

Figure 1 Schema for a feedback loop “correcting” voter-party congruence

The story shown there starts with a successful party feeling free to drift away from supporter
preferences (arrow 1), often due to party activists’ desires to “purify” the party’s message, resulting
in declining congruence between party polices and supporter preferences. In response, voters
reduce the support they give to the party at that election (arrow 2). All of this happens during the
run up to an election whose outcome becomes known at the point in time labeled t1 in the schema.
Party leaders use this signal to pressure their activist base into adopting more moderate party
positions (which can take quite time to achieve), leading to policies being adjusted only after some
delay, at timepoint t3 (often policy adjustment only happens after a second bad election outcome,
somewhere along arrow 3, which occurs at a timepoint not shown on the schema). That adjustment
5

restores voter-party congruence (arrow 4) in the eyes of previous supporters who, at the ensuing
election (still at timepoint t3) reward the party for its improved (to their eyes) policy stances,
restoring party support (arrow 5). But this strips party leaders of the argument that had previously
brought their activist base to toe the leadership line (arrow 6), and brings us back to arrow 1.
Note that there is no theoretical or empirical reason why arrow 6 should be travelled immediately following arrow 5. The point reached at the end of arrow 5 is a point of equilibrium and
nothing in our theorizing suggests how much time will pass before party policies again start to
diverge from supporter preferences (hence the appearance of a “+” sign after the t3 indicator at the
end of arrow 5). A successful party leader might be able to delay that divergence for a considerable
period, perhaps indefinitely.
Two things about the process illustrated in Figure 1 make its causal nature readily identifiable
statistically. First, the passage of time is involved. Parties respond to voter signals only after a
palpable delay, meaning we do not rely for evidence of causality on the weak standard of “constant
conjunction” (things that happen together may be causally connected) but the more stringent
standard of “Granger causality” (a cause must precede its consequence). Second, the process
accords with extant empirical findings regarding responsiveness of national policy-making to voter
preferences, showing negative feedback from an earlier time-point as policy-makers “correct” their
policies in light of changing public preferences (e.g. Wlezien 1995; Jennings and John 2009; for a
survey see Wlezien 2018). Negative feedback makes it easy to distinguish the responses of policymakers from the signals given by voters, since their coefficients have different signs.
Franklin and Lutz (2020) used left-right locations of parties as surrogates for policy positions
and focused on whether parties “corrected” those locations in response to supporter signals. I do
the same in the online Appendix A to this chapter, using respondent judgments to code party
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positions and taking votes cast as the signals most relevant to party leaders and activists (details
methodological concerns and robustness checks are in all four of the online appendices).
The original contribution of the present chapter is to suggest a related feedback loop that
connects the voter turnout rate with the rate of party support. The intuition is that, when previous
supporters “punish” their party by withdrawing electoral support, those previous supporters do not
necessarily vote for a different party. More often they simply fail to vote at all. So failures by
parties to take policy stances popular with their supporters do not just cost those parties seats in
their country’s legislature but may cost the entire political system the votes of many citizens,
lowering the turnout rate.4 This will tend to happen when the largest party(ies) – generally the
one(s) seen to have “won” the previous election – lose(s) support. The linkage is not a logical
necessity. It might be absent in particular instances. But it appears to be present sufficiently often
as to produce the findings regarding turnout contained in this chapter’s online Appendix A.
Elections in democracies are very public events and enthusiasm (or the lack of it) are both of them
contagious, presumably helping to keep the stimulus to voter turnout in sync across supporters of
different parties.
In this handbook chapter there is not space to describe the exploratory party-level analyses that
have suggested the form taken by a model that matches, for turnout, the analyses conducted by
Franklin and Lutz (2020) for party support. Such a model is shown in this chapter’s online
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At the party level there is no empirical difference between the variable measuring turnout and the variable
measuring party choice. Party support can be interpreted in either way, although the lag structure for a
turnout model differs from the lag structure for a party support model.. The ambiguity of the party support
variable in a model such as that employed by Franklin and Lutz (2020) signals what has always been a
troubling disconnect between the turnout literature (including my own contributions) and the party choice
literature. After all, turning out to vote involves picking a party to vote for, as originally pointed out by
Campbell et al. (1960: 96-7). Here I bring the two strands of literature together for perhaps the first time
since that pathbreaking study.
7

Appendix A. In the main text of this chapter I mainly address the implications of the party-level
turnout findings for individual-level turnout analyses, also the focus of much previous turnout
research. Those analyses will explore the individual-lecel mechanism by which previously higher
turnout rates might be restored. Given the party-level findings, voter-party issue congruence (here
operationalized in terms of left-right proximity between voters and parties) should be involved.
Following Plutzer (2002), partisanship should also play a role. Partisanship has sometimes been
included in individual-level models, though only occasionally. It is generally excluded because it
“eats up” such a large proportion of effects on turnout that pass by way of partisanship as an
intervening variable. To the best of my knowledge, voter-party congruence has never previously
been included in such analyses. My conjectures regarding the impact of party-level feedback for
turnout suggest that both partisanship and congruencg are essential for well-specified models at
the individual level.
The mechanism I propose involves changes in the complexion of a country’s electorate that
would occur between t1 and t3 in Figure 1. A relevant way in which the t3 electorate will differ
from the t1 electorate in that, at t3, all of the citizens who, at t1, were learning the habit of voting
(or not) will have been transformed from impressionable young adults into habitual voters (or nonvoters). Their passage through this socializing process will have been shaped by their experiences
of elections held during that two-election period. For those individuals, the elections concerned
will have been formative. If the elections were hard-fought, more young adults will have acquired
the strong partisanship associated with a habit of voting than if those elections were foregone conclusions. In that manner, position in the party-level feedback loop will have become embedded in
the individual-level “footprint” that formative elections leave within the age-structure of an
electorate (Franklin 2004:43).
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But note that, when we include independent variables in a model because of their relevance at
a different level of aggregation, apparent effects may rather reflect the process that is underway at
that different level than play a causal role. The ambiguity regarding the roles of particular coefficients calls for careful interpretation of apparent effects not only for variables from a different
level of aggregation. It is quite general problem of interpretation like others that I now address.

4) Problems of analysis and interpretation
The countries on which I focus in this chapter are a subset of the 22 countries that were studied in
my (2004) volume Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established
Democracies Since 1945. Those 22 countries are the only ones that have held elections continuously since within one electoral cycle of the end of World War II. I avoided countries that
experienced non-democratic rule during the lifetimes of 2004 citizens because the mechanisms of
long-term turnout change that I documented in that volume are primarily processes of generational
replacement, as older cohorts of voters are replaced by newly adult cohorts at election after
election. Newly adult cohorts have not yet established a habit of voting, giving them malleability
in the face of influences that differ from those that governed the learning of older cohorts, with
consequences for the equilibrium turnout-rate that may shift over time. Such influences are wellunderstood in established democracies but as soon we include countries that transitioned to
democracy (or had non-democratic periods) during the lifetimes of adult citizens, we introduce
contaminants that are specific to each country and which are in any case not well-understood.
In my (2004) volume I mainly employed election-level aggregate data, though this was supplemented by survey findings to the extent that surveys were available. Just six of the 22 countries had
histories of academic voter studies covering enough elections to make time-series analyses feasible
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at an appropriate level of aggregation. As I revisit this subfield 20 years later I find more than twice
that number of countries with a useable sequence of voter studies, so in this chapter I employ mainly
survey data. The 14 countries on which I focus are Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom
and the United States. See Franklin (2004) and this chapter’s online Appendix A for details. I merge
the surveys with aggregate data mainly from the IDEA Voter Turnout Database and the PARLGOV
database of parties elections and governments.5 Additional data sources are reported in Appendix B
of my (2004) volume.
Survey data at the individual level has the huge disadvantage of overstating the turnout rate,
due to non-response and overreporting (Dahlgaard et al, 2019). This problem can be mitigated by
weighting the survey data to official turnout, as I have done in past work and do in this chapter,6
allowing me to benefit from survey data’s primary advantage: it permits researchers to look within
electorates at population subgroups theoretically expected to be especially susceptible to effects of
different types. In particular, my (2004) volume theorized and then tested the special susceptibility
of newly adult voters to short-term effects such as those of electoral clarity and margin of victory.
In order to distinguish long-term from short-term effects for countries lacking survey data, I used

5

The IDEA database does not include more than a single election during any calendar year for any one
country so I used the ParlGov archive to fill some gaps. US turnout has always caused problems for
comparative studies (Franklin 2004:86-88) because voter registration in that country is lower than
elsewhere. Contemporary scholars employ Voter Eligible Turnout (VEP) for the US (percent voting out of
those eligible to vote) even as they use turnout as a percentage of registered voters elsewhere. My VEP
turnout data for the US are taken from Michael McDonald’s United States Elections Project website
(http://www.electproject.org/national-1789-present – accessed in September 2020).

6

Increasing the weight of respondents who did not vote while reducing the weight of voting counterparts
matches the sizes of each group to those in the voting population (see online Appendix C). Unfortunately
hierarchical modeling procedures can seldom handle weights within strata so I am obliged to use regression
models that employ a battery of country dummies to enforce fixed effects.
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election-level data in conjunction with a weighting strategy that incorporated the fluctuating sizes
of newly adult cohorts, thus giving each such cohort a distinct “signature,” in terms of those
fluctuations, that could be used to identify each cohort even as it aged (for details see Franklin
2004:122-126). The findings reported in the present chapter replicate those earlier findings but do
so while employing data that allow new cohorts of voters to be identified by their birth-dates,
improving accuracy as well as transparency.7
Unfortunately, one of the variables found important in my earlier research (female suffrage
extensions) sees no variation over the countries and periods for which I have survey data. So I
cannot validate my findings regarding that variables. Critical election studies are missing for the
only country (Switzerland) that extended votes to women over recent decades.
To distinguish long-term from short-term forces at the individual level I take advantage of the
fact, already noted, that ephemeral effects are registered primarily by newly adult cohorts of voters
– individuals who have not yet acquired settled voting habits that would insulate them from such
effects. Long-term forces, by contrast, are those that have become “baked-in” to the behavior of
voters who have already acquired habits of voting (or of non-voting).8 Whether a particular force
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Transparency is also improved by presenting survey findings at the individual level, rather than aggregated
to the level of electoral cohorts. This requires that I get my measure of past voting from answers to the
question whether respondents voted in the previous election (referred to in what follows as the “quasilagged outcome”), rather than from each cohort’s actual vote at the previous election; and recall of past
vote will be overstated in survey data in the same way as recall of the recent election’s vote. But the same
weighting strategy should deal with both problems.
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The number of times the same choice needs to be repeated in order for it to become habitual is not
definitively established. Franklin (2004) followed Butler and Stokes (1969) in supposing the effective
number to be 3 while Johnston et al (2005), along with Bruter and Harrison (2020) fastened on 2. In practice
defections from habitual behavior decline with each repetition of the behavior concerned, so the cut-point
is somewhat arbitrary. In this chapter, for consistency with party level findings, I treat individual voters as
newly adult when facing either of their first two elections. Findings are not dissimilar if other definitions
11

is short-term or long-term at any given point in time is effectively a matter for empirical assessment
but the way in which that assessment is made is different for survey data than it is for aggregate
data. With party-level aggregate data (as used by Franklin and Lutz 2020) one can identify a shortterm force from the rapid decay of its effect as the turnout series moves back towards its long-term
equilibrium. With the individual-level survey data that I will use in followint sections, I can
identify short-term forces as ones whose effects are felt primarily by newly-adult cohorts of voters.
But the fact that these forces are distinguished in such very different ways at each level of analysis
must be kept in mind when associating party-level effects with their individual-level counterparts.9
Perhaps the most consequential analysis problem still facing scholars who would try to
understand the mainsprings of voter turnout variation is highlighted by the question “in turnout
studies, what is a well-specified model?” Most studies of voter turnout focus either on the individual level, and ask why people vote. Alternatively they focus on the election level, and ask: why
turnout sits at a given rate and why that rate varies across countries and/or over time? Earlier
sections of this chapter make it clear that the party level is another level of aggregation at which it
is appropriate to ask (at the very least) why the turnout rate (average party support) varies over
time. In my (2004) volume I tried to demonstrate that models at the individual level of aggregation
would be mis-specified if they did not include variables detailing the character of the elections at

are employed (see this chapter’s online Appendix B).
9

See online Appendix D. A further methodological problem for individual-level analyses of turnout is that
the dependent variable is binary and, in political science research, with such outcomes it is common practice
is to employ probit or logit analysis. However, the non-linearity of the dependent variable in such analyses
makes it problematic to include interaction terms (Ai and Norton 2003; Buis 2010), which I need if I am to
distinguish effects on new cohorts of voters from effects on older cohorts. This problem is overcome if,
instead of logit models, I employ linear probability models (which use OLS regression). Such models are
widely used by econometricians (Kennedy 2008; Angrist and Pischke 2008) and it can be shown that
findings are hardly different when using one method rather than the other (see online Appendix B).
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which turnout was measured; similarly, the brunt of the entire book was to demonstrate that
individual-level forces (especially generational replacement) affected turnout at the aggregate
level. Those demonstrations appear to have gone largely unnoticed. Over the subsequent 17 years,
to the best of my knowledge turnout models at each level have largely failed to include measures
originating at the other level of analysis (an exception is the closeness of the race, frequently
included in individual-level turnout models).
In this chapter I want to make my point in more dramatic language: the problem with individuallevel models of why people vote is that they do not explain either the turnout rate or its variation
over time, including its decline in many countries that began during the final quarter of the
twentieth Century.10 The first thing we need to do in order to explain change in turnout-rate over
time, using individual-level data, is to insert a measure of past voting into the model. But, when
we do that, the effect of age immediately becomes non-significant, statistically, and the effect of
age squared changes its sign – becoming positive (see Table 1, Model A in the next section). The
remainder of this chapter is much concerned with producing better-specified models with the
object of ultimately rendering both age and age-squared non-significant, statistically – elaborating
those variables by treating them as constitutive terms in age-related interactions that clarify their
functioning.

5) Understanding individual-level concomitants of turnout evolution
How does dynamic turnout equilibration at the party level of aggregation reveal itself at the
individual level? Table 1’s Model A shows coefficients estimating the effects of the quasi-lagged
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It was long ago pointed out that trying to explain the rate of turnout would be a rather quixotic enterprise
(Groffman 1993) and that political scientists would do better to emulate economists who focus on
explaining change in their variables of interest.
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outcome, demographic and knowledge indicators, and an indicator for recently adult respondents.
That last indicator’s coefficien is negative, as expected, but surprisingly small.11 Interactions of
what are sometimes called “main effects” (Brambor et al., 2006, would rather see us describe them
as “constitutive terms”) with this indicator in Models B and C show how different are effects for
newly adult respondents than for established cohorts. The constitutive terms taken separately show
effects on respondents who are not newly adult. Consistent with similar labels used in my (2004)
volume, effects of these constitutive terms taken alone are labeled “long-term effects.” Short-term
effects are not labeled as such in the table. We get those by adding “short-term interactions” to
corresponding long-term effects. So, for example, the short-term effect of partisanship in Row 5
of Model D is 0.04 greater than its long-term effect of 0.15 in Row 2). Short-term forces apply to
younger cohorts that are not expected to have yet acquired settled habits of voting or non-voting.
For them, effects can result in behavioral differences from one time-point to the next – differences
that can thus bring immediate turnout change. Older cohorts show differences that should only
bring turnout change through generational replacement. Of course, it is possible for a variable to
have both long-term and short-term effects, in which case the short- term component is expected
to dissipate as newly adult cohorts move beyond their habit-forming phase under the influence of
factors identified by Plutzer (2002).
A critical difference between this measurement strategy and the strategy employed in party-level
models is that, here, the time-horizon for individual-level short-term effects is encoded in the data,
whereas at the party level this horizon can be determined empirically. In this chapter the individuallevel time horizon was chosen to match a t-2 horizon found empirically at the party level, as already
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The small size of the newly adult coefficient suggests another specification error, additional to the
counter-intuitive age effects. This will be a topic for Section 5.
14

mentioned (see Figure 1 and online Appendix A).
Table 1 Effects of age and partisanship on the decision to vote (fixed effects linear probability models with data weighted to official turnout)
Model A
Model B
Model C+ Model D +
Age
Partisanship Proximity Demographics
Coef.
( (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef.
( (s.e.)
Coef.( (s.e.)

Outcome: Voted or not
Inputs:

0.26
( (0.00)

1) 1) Quasi-lagged outcome (0-1)
Long-term effects
2) 2) Partisan closeness (0-3, recoded 0-1)
3) 3) Proximity to party (left-right; 0-1)
4) 4) Newly adult at recent election (0,1)

0.26 (0.00)

0.25 (0.00)

0.15 (0.00)

-0.03 (0.00) -0.10 (0.00)

Short-term interactions
5) 5) New*partisanship
6) 6) New*proximity

0.15 (0.00)
0.01
( (0.01)ns
-0.11 (0.01) - -0.08 (0.01)
0.04 (0.01)

D Demographic and knowledge covariates
7) Age
-0.01( (0.02)ns
8) Age-squared
0.12 (0.02)
9) Education (highest reachedl, recoded 0-1) 0.09 (0.00)
10) Religion (0, 1=named)
0.03 (0.00)
11) Marital status (0, 1=married)
0.09 (0.00)
12) Income (quintiles, recoded 0-1)
0.07 (0.00)
13) Knowledge (average of 0,1 battery)
0.13 (0.00)
14) Union member in family (0, 1=yes)
0.02 (0.00)
15) Demographic interactions with New
NO
Fixed effects
YES
7) Constant
0.25 (0.01)
R-squared
Countries
Observations

0.25 (0.00)

0.22
14
267,499

0.07
( (0.03)ns 0.07 (0.03)ns
-0.05 (0.03)ns -0.05 (0.03)ns
0.07
0.(0.00) 0.08 (0.00)
0.04 (0.00)
9
0.04 (0.00)
0.12
(0.(0.00) 0.12 (0.00)
0.02
(0.(0.00)
2
0.03
( (0.01)
0.08
(0.(0.00) 0.08
( (0.00)
0.01((0.01) 0.01 (0.00)
YES1
(
YES
YES
YES
029 (0.00) 0.43 (0.01)

0.23
14
267,499

0.22
14
267,499

0.04 (0.01)
-0.05
( (0.01)
0.06 (0.03)ns
-0.05 (0.03)ns
0.03 (0.00)
0.08 (0.00)
0.11 (0.00)
0.02 (0.00)
0.07 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)ns
YES
YES
0.26 (0.01)

0.25
14
267,499

Note: All coefficients significant at .001, two-tailed except where marked ns (not significant). All
variables standardized to range from 0 to 1. Re “Quasi-lagged outcome” see Footnote 7.

Models B to D progressively add, first, interactions of demographic variables with the newlyadult indicator, then respondent-reported strength of partisanship for theparty to which they feel
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most attached;12 and, finally, proximity to the party to which they feel closest in left–right terms.
Happily, interactions with the recently adult indicator (Row 15) resolve the problem of incorrectly
signed age effects, which fail to reach significance in Models B-D (but in these models we use a
very demanding level of significance; greater progress toward eliminating residual age effects is
made in Table 2 below). Moreover the effect of being newly adult, which is implausibly small in
Row 4 of Model A, is boosted to a more plausible magnitude in Models B-D. However, this
coefficient does not decline when the partisanship indicator is added in Model C, telling us that
acquisition of partisanship does not account for effects of aging as some might have supposed.
By contrast, the addition of left-right proximity in Model D does significantly reduce the effect
of being newly adult, suggesting that it might be proximity rather than partisanship that is
associated with relevant effects of aging. Model D actually shows negative effects of proximity,
on balance, among new cohorts of voters if we take the interaction in Row 6 along with its
corresponding long-term effect in Row 3 (0.01 - 0.05 = -0.04. The negative sign might surprise,
but this effect appears to play no causal role, rather signaling a feature of new cohorts of voters:
that they are generally located further in left-right terms from the parties that are vying for their
votes (this makes sense if young adults are still learning where the different parties stand).
The overall negative short-term effect of proximity among the newly adult also tells us that this
variable displaces the age effect quite otherwise than through collinearity with turnout, the generally
expected mechanism. Importantly, the passage of time appears to be involved in this substitution.
Older voters see strong effects of partisanship (0.15 in Models C and D Row 2), seemingly because
those older voters were once themselves newly adult and, at that time, experienced their own

12

Using respondents as experts and employing their judgments to code party locations might be thought
problematic. See the discussion at the end of online Appendix B.
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transitions to habitual voting. During such transitions, it only makes sense that finding a proximate
party (or not) should play an important role, encouraging the acquisition of partisanship (or not).13
Our party-level model in Figure 1 suggests that such young adults will be the focus of more intense
mobilization efforts in some circumstances than in others, thus producing a larger number of strong
partisans in some circumstances than in others.
Coefficients associated with this transition might appear surprisingly small; but we should bear
in mind that survey error serves to mute individual level coefficients compared to their aggregatelevel counterparts.14

6) Considering election-level inputs to turnout models
The main contribution of my (2004) volume to voting studies was incorporating individual-level
sources of dynamic turnout change into election-level models of voter turnout. The present chapter
has looked more deeply at those sources and suggested the existence of additional dynamic
processes at the party level of analysis. In this section I replicate election-level findings from my
(2004) volume at the individual-level,15 and add variables suggested by party-level findings in this
chapter’s online Appendix A. I do this to establish (1) whether effects identified at the party level
survive the introduction of controls for well-established drivers of country-level turnout variations
and (2) whether those controls remove the hints of specification error that were evident in Table 1

13

The transmutation of low proximity into high partisanship over the course of two electoral cycles elaborates Plutzer’s (2002) finding by suggesting a route by which well-endowed young adults acquire their
partisanship (through finding a party they feel close to in policy terms).

14

Still, effects for partisanship of 0.19 among newly adult voters (adding the terms in rows 2 and 5 of Model
D) are not very different from equivalent party-level effects in online Appendix A.

15

One of those findings (regarding female suffrage extensions) cannot be replicated with a dataset that
covers a later period in time, as already mentioned.
17

(see footnote 11).
Table 2 pursues these objectives using three models. Model A replicates my (2004) analysis.
Model B adds the two variables whose roles are original to the present chapter: partisanship
(strength of party attachment) and proximity in left-right terms of respondents to the party they
feel closest to. Model C adds the individual-level covariates, already seen in Table 1, so as to
produce a more fully specified model that includes all types of variables ever used in turnout
models, at whatever levels of analysis.
As in Table 1, these models identify long-term effects by constitutive terms taken alone. Shortterm effects are found by adding relevant interaction coefficients (new * constitutive term in the
table). For example, marginality is a quintessential short-term factor, because the gap in votes cast
between the largest and second-largest parties changes from election to election. This variable has
more than three times the effect among younger voters in Model A, as can be seen by adding the
coefficients (0.02 + 0.05) in Rows 5 and 16 and comparing the result with the Row 5 coefficient
taken alone. Cohesiveness of the party system (legislative party discipline) is, by contrast, a
quintessentially long-term factor; meaning that effects for established cohorts of voters should
dominate and, indeed, its short-term component does not reach statistical significance in any of
the models in Row 18, meaning that its short-term effect is not statistically different from its longterm effect.
One variable previously identified as long-term (electorate size, Row 9) fails to produce the
expected significantly negative long-term effect in Model C (its long-term effect is significantly
negative in the other models but Model C should be better-specified). This variable is the only one
whose long-term effect in Model C blatantly contradicts expectations derived from my (2004)
analyses. Moreover, short term interactions for this variable are uniformly positive for all models
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Table 2 Long-term and short-term effects on the decision to vote (fixed effects linear
probability models with data weighted to official turnout)

Outcome: voted or not
Inputs

Model A : Model B:
Election- and
Adding
individual-level party-level
effects
effects

Model C:
Adding
demographic
covariates

Coef. (s.e.)

Coef. (s.e.)

Coef. (s.e.)

0.28 (0.00)

0.26 (0.00)

0.30 (0.00)
1) Quasi-lagged outcome
Long-term effects (significance expected in rows 6-11)
2) Partisanship (strength of attachment; 0-1)
3) Proximity to party (0-1)
-0.01 (0.01)ns
4) Clarity of election (1-abs(seatShareP1-0.5))
0.01 (0.01) ns
5) Marginality (1-(seatShareP1-seatShareP2))
-0.01 (0.01) ns
6) Time-gap from previous election (rescaled 0-1)
0.03 (0.01)
7) Cohesive party system (expert judgement: 0,1)
0.12 (0.01)
8) Compulsory voting (0,1)
9) Electorate size (registration as proportion of max) -0.09 (0.02)
10) Responsiveness of executive to legislature (0-1) 0.00 (0.02) ns
-0.03 (0.00)
11) Younger eligibility to vote (at age 18; 0,1)
12) Newly adult at this or the previous election (0,1) -0.06 (0.02)
Short-term interactions (significance expected in rows 13-16)
13) New * partisanship
14) New * proximity
0.12 (0.01)
15) New * clarity
0.05 (0.01)
16) New * marginality
-0.16
(0.01)
17) New * time-gap
-0.00 (0.01) ns
18) New * cohesive
0.10 (0.01)
19) New * compulsory
0.17 (0.01)
20) New * electorate
0.07 (0.01)
21) New * responsiveness
-0.02 (0.01)
22) New * younger-eligible
Demographic and knowledge covariates
23) Age
24) Age-squared
(More) demographics
Fixed effects
Constant
R-squared
Countries
Observations

NO
YES

0.16 (0.00)
0.15 (0.00)
0.01 (0.01) ns 0.00 (0.01) ns
-0.01 (0.01) ns -0.03 (0.01)
0.00 (0.01) ns 0.01 (0.01) ns
-0.00 (0.01) ns 0.05 (0.01)
0.03 (0.01)
0.02 (0.01)
0.10 (0.01)
0.12 (0.01)
-0.09 (0.02)
0.04 (0.02) ns
0.02 (0.02) ns 0.07 (0.02)
-0.02 (0.00)
-0.03 (0.00)
-0.04 (0.02)
-0.05 (0.02)
0.03 (0.01)
0.03 (0.01)
-0.04 (0.01)
-0.03 (0.01)
0.09 (0.01)
0.11 (0.01)
0.05 (0.01)
0.06 (0.01)
-0.14 (0.01)
-0.12 (0.01)
-0.01 (0.01) ns 0.00 (0.01) ns
0.09 (0.01)
0.10 (0.01)
0.16 (0.01)
0.08 (0.01)
0.07 (0.01)
0.06 (0.01)
-0.03 (0.01)
-0.04 (0.01)
-0.00 (0.02)ns
-0.02 (0.03)ns
NO
YES

YES
YES

0.51 (0.03)
0.42 (0.03)
0.10((0.02)
0.21
0.22
0.25
14
14
14
267,499
267,499
267,499

Notes: All coefficients significant at p<.001 except as marked “ns”. SeatsShareP1 is largest party proportion,
SeatShareP2 second-largest party. Regarding “Quasi-lagged outcome” see footnote 7. For other variables
see Appendix B in Franklin (2004). Additional variables mentioned there prove no more significant in this
analysis than in earlier work. Individual level: rows 2-3 and 11-12; cross-level: 13-22; election level: others.
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In row 18, suggesting that theoretical approaches underpinning expectations of lower turnout in
large electorates should be revisited. Another surprise in these findings is that time-gap since the
previous election has an effect on recently adult cohorts that is opposite in sign to (and, taking the
constitutive terms together, larger than) the effect found for established cohorts. Importantly, members of newly adult cohorts are more likely to vote if elections come in quick succession than if
the mobilizing effects of a previous election have had time to dissipate. But the generally significant effects of short-term interactions for variables originally theorized to have long-term
effects do not in themselves contradict past findings since analyses for my (2004) volume were
not able to estimate short-term effects of variables theorized to be long-term in nature.16 In this
chapter we take a big step forward with analyses that contrst short-term with long-term effects for
all variables, adding important nuance to our overall understanding of turnout effects.
Models B and C both confirm the effects of partisanship and proximity found in Section 5. Here
we see a long-term effect of partisanship that is the strongest of any effect in the table – stronger
even than the long-term effect of compulsory voting. But when it comes to previously theorized
effects, we see that the demographic effects, added in Model C, are essential for obtaining electionlevel effects whose patterns and general magnitudes come close to according with my (2004) findings. With individual-level data it matters that models be fully-specified. The same appears true
for the demographic effects themselves. Model C shows only two of these, age and age-squared
(additional demographic and knowledge effects are in online Appendix B) but age and age-squared
are the effects that were wrongly signed in Model A of Table 1. Comparing effects of these
variables in Model C of Table 2 with their effects in Table 1 lets us see that these variables become
better-behaved as models become more fully-specified.

16

This was due to methodological limitations, mentioned in Section 4, inherent in the earlier study.
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7) Conclusions
This chapter has established the need to include, in individual-level turnout models, variables from
multiple levels of aggregation. Without all levels being represented, models are under-specified
(sometimes grievously). More importantly, the inclusion of individual-level counterparts to certain
party-level effects has illuminated the dynamic processes that underly turnout variations It has for
some time been evident to scholars that voter turnout sits in a (slowly shifting) dynamic
equilibrium where the turnout rate is determined by long-term forces. What was unknown was
how that equilibrium turnout rate was maintained.
I suggested in Section 3 that equilibration is promoted by forces most clearly evident at the
party level of aggregation, where a long-term (though shifting) equilibrium in support for different
parties is sustained by negative feedback. In that section I posited associated dynamics for voter
turnout, whose long-term stability seems deeply entwined with that of party support.17 As support
for a party goes up so parties are freed to move away from the positions preferred by their voters,
resulting in voter disenchantment at the following election. This lowers the turnout rate even as it
stimulates parties to adjust their policies in response supporter preferences, leading to increased
electoral competition and tending to restore the previous turnout-rate. To the extent that variations
in party cometitiveness are synchronized across parties, turnout at the election level will follow
the pattern of increasing and reducing electoral competition at the party level.
However surprising this may seem, it is what appears to happen in practice. Online Appendix
A tests models of turnout dynamics that feature both voter-party congruence and voter support for
parties. At the party level of aggregation, seemingly synchronized changes in left-right proximity

17

For additional perspectives on the maintenance of party system stability see Weber and Franklin (2018).
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and party support produce a negative feedback loop that explains roughly the same percentage of
turnout variability as the percentage that left-right proximity explains of variability in party
support. Still, the findings must be regarded as preliminary. A two-election cycle eats up a lot of
degrees of freedom, limiting the statistical reliability of some aspects of the findings; and the
micro-level foundations of synchronized changes in party competition are still speculative.
The role for party-level voter-party left-right proximity (congruence) in promoting an equilibrium rate of voter turnout also raises measurement issues but, though closeness to parties in leftright terms (as judged by survey respondents) might be biased by varying amounts of wishful
thinking (but see the Appendix B ‘Note on respondent perceptions of party positions’), the
reactions by parties cannot be questioned on the same grounds since what party leaders see when
they see declining voter support is surely not what they hope to see.
A larger puzzle was to find a mechanism, in survey data, that would parallel the one at the party
level where negotiations between party leaders and party activists likely account for delay in party
responses to declining voter support – a delay that confirms the causal nature of this feedback.
Finding a theoretically plausible source for equivalent delay at the individual level was a motivation
underlying analyses presented in Section 5 of this chapter, where newly adult respondents were
found to be largely distinguished from their older counterparts by their greater distance from parties
in left-right terms. The resulting intuition saw Plutzer’s (2002) developmental process as providing
the required mechanism, since it comes with an inherend time-lapse before we see the individuallevel negative feedback that “corrects” turnout declines – a time-lapse that matches the delay
inherent in the party-level mechanism that “corrects” declines in party support.
Because the timing of this individual-level transformation can be matched to the timing of the
party-support negative-feedback loop, it seems plausible to suppose that the rate at which partisanship is acquired during this learning perios responds to the extent of electoral competition that
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newly adult individuals experience. It makes sense that more strongly competitive elections should
produce greater numbers of strong partisans (after the relevant delay) though micro-foundations of
the control mechanism are still poorly identified.. This should be an urgent focus for future research,
with analyses that employ Plutzer’s methodological innovations being elaborated to include partylevel measures of electoral competition.
Section 6 introduced election-level variables previously found to set the long-term equilibrium
turnout rate. These do not explain away the individual-level effects of variables responsible for
turnout re-equilibration. Rather, if anything, the opposite occurs: adding partisanship to the
election-level analysis, in Model B of Table 2, somewhat reduces (on balance) observed long-term
effects of classic election-level turnout determinants, even while clarifying the individual-level
processes that underpin apparent age effects.
The derivative nature of individual-level turnout covariation discovered in this chapter suggests
that future research should reappraise the direction of causality commonly assumed for other
supposed individual-level sources of turnout evolution, subjecting classic individual-level turnout
covariates to the same sort of interpretative lens as has, in this chapter, been used to study
individual-level concomitants of party-level forces. If we do so we may find that changing
magnitudes of individual-level turnout differences across such variables as education and political
knowledge rather reflect higher-level turnout changes than cause them, as we have found to be the
case with voter-party congruence.
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